Djævelens Advokat

Lars Hvidberg og jeg har i snart 3 måneder brugt broderparten af vores fritid på at planlægge, optage og redigere et politisk debatprogram i podcastformat. Nu er tiden endelig kommet til at lancere programmet der hedder Djævelens Advokat og har hjemme her. Baggrunden for og formålet med Djævelens Advokat kan læses i vores mission statement.

Første udsendelse er med Morten Kjærum (tilgængelig fra 1. marts 2006) og omhandler ikke overraskende menneskerettigheder, herunder spørgsmål om universalitet, økonomiske og sociale rettigheder og politisering.

Det er Lars' og mit håb, at programmet vil udvikle sig som et seriøst alternativ til DRs de facto monopol på seriøs debat. Vi synes selv vi har nogle spændende gæster linet up såsom, Christopher Arzrouni, Kasper Støvring, Jesper Langballe og Preben Wilhjelm og vi er i kontakt med mange flere.

Lyt med og kom med Jeres kommentarer til både form og indhold.

Frihedens stemme i Mellemøsten

For de mange der har fundet en oase i mellemøstlige bloggere, som Sandmonkey, ordoesitexplode, freedomforegyptians og Muttawa, kan jeg anbefale Middle East Transparent, hvis stifter Pierre Akel bliver interviewet i det nyeste nummer af Reason Magazine. Denne hjemmeside er fyldt med artikler af intellektuelle fra Mellemøsten, som forsøger at medvirke til realiseringen af et friere klima i regionen. Bl.a. har tre muslimske intellektuelle startet en kampagne for en international straffedomstol for terrorister!.

Efter sigende har siden 50-60.000 besøgende om dagen, mest fra arabiske lande da de fleste artikler, desværre, er på arabisk. Interviewet med Reasons Michale Young er i øvrigt også interessant, idet det giver et noget mere nuanceret billede af Mellemøsten end vi er vant til at få serveret:

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, it seemed to me that Arab
liberals had to take a stand against the barbarian wave threatening to engulf
the region. The danger was imminent. Only, no one could provide a comprehensive
definition of Arab liberal currents. Americans tended to rely on
English-speaking analysts, many of whom live in the United States and Europe. My
friend Barry Rubin has written extensively on Arab liberals. However, Barry does
not read Arabic and has what I call a "pro-Israel bias." He tends to shed a
negative light on Arab liberals. I myself was much more familiar with the
Islamic fundamentalist movement than with liberal currents. I had talked to the
"Londonstan" leaders, read their writings and explored the many fundamentalist
Web sites in Saudi Arabia.

Metransparent was an
attempt to explore such liberal currents as exist inside the Middle East. I
discovered the different strains of Arab liberalism along with my readers. An
independent Web site was necessary in order to allow people to write what they
really had in mind, not merely what they were allowed to write. It was also
necessary as a forum for the diverse currents in the region.

We get our articles by email from practically every Arab country.
Right now we have too many opinion pieces and are late in publishing what we
receive. Most of the authors—we have more than 200—write exclusively for us;
some send their articles to Arabic newspapers and to us, and we publish
complete, uncensored versions. I believe we have something like 25 opinion
articles from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates per
week, a bit more from Egypt, and many more from Syria, which has a formidable
civil society movement. Tunisians also contribute quite a bit, as well as
Moroccans, especially Berber intellectuals, and Yemenis, Algerians,
etc.

I am especially proud to say that, soon, half of
our writers shall be women. Usually, I receive letters from potential authors
asking what "our conditions" are for accepting contributions. We answer back
that we are a democratic and liberal Web site, with no censorship or red
lines.

The Web site also has a reputation as a forum
for liberal Shiites, both Saudi and Lebanese. But, most importantly, I believe
we are the most daring site in advocating an Islamic Reformation, as represented
by such writers as Gamal Banna [the brother of the founder of the Muslim
Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna], Judge Said al-Ashmawy, and Sayyid al-Qimny, all
from Egypt; and by many writers in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Islamic reformers
are part and parcel of the Arab liberal movement. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are the
two countries where calls for an Islamic Reformation are the most
advanced.

[...]In the Arab world, much more than in
the West, we can genuinely talk of a blog revolution. Arab culture has been
decimated during the last 50 years. Arab newspapers are mainly under Saudi
control. The book market is practically dead. Some of the best authors pay to
have their books published in the order of 3,000 copies for a market of 150
million. This is ridiculous. Even when people write, they face censorship at
every level—other than their own conscious or unconscious censorship. Meanwhile,
professional journalism is rare.

In the future, I
would like Metransparent to promote tens (or even hundreds) of blogs
representing human rights and activists groups in many Arab cities. This has
already started.

Om den amerikanske invasion af Irak:

Most liberals, at least among our writers, favored the U.S. military
intervention in Iraq. I myself have written articles in support, before and
after the invasion. I didn't support it because of Iraqi WMD, however, but for
democracy. We would have liked President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony
Blair to say openly that they were invading to liberate the Iraqi people.
Remember, even Riad Turk was not against the U.S. intervention. A Syrian, Abdul
Razzaq Eid, who spent most of his life in the doctrinaire Syrian Communist Party
of Khaled Bekdash, even wrote articles welcoming it.

Things changed with the disaster that was Paul Bremer. The U.S.
should have turned things over to the Iraqis immediately after liberation.
Former Pentagon official Richard Perle was absolutely right about this point.
Most liberals still believe the U.S. is serious about democracy, for reasons
explained by Bush in his second inaugural address. Democracy in the Middle East
has become a vital American interest. It's either democracy or many future Osama
bin Ladens striking against U.S. interests.

I admit
some liberals took longer to overcome the Arab-Islamic taboo against approving
foreign intervention. This is increasingly behind us. Yet, what Iraq proved was
that the U.S. could not do the job alone. Internal democratic forces had to be
mobilized. We are part of this "internal" process. I should add that outside
intervention should not only be military. Ideally, we would like something like
the Helsinki Accords, where the international community's relations with the
Arab world involve spreading democracy, defending Arab dissidents, human rights,
women's rights and minority rights. Syrian dissidents have been calling for this
for years. Last year, Metransparent circulated a petition asking the United
Nations to create an International Court to judge the authors of fatwas
condemning people to death

Det er sådanne initiativer, der giver håb om, at vi i fremtiden kan få et Mellemøsten, hvor religiøse fanatikere og kleptokratiske diktatorer ikke præger dagsordnen. Vejen er lang, meget lang, men håb det er der.

Hykleri

Jeg har et indlæg på Punditokraterne vedrørende det faktum, at Muhammed tegningerne blev bragti en egyptisk avis allerede i oktober 2005.

Muhammed i National Review

National Review har, over to omgange, spurgt en hel række prominente debattører og kommentatorer, herunder Daniel Pipes og Mustafa Akyol, hvordan de anskuer Mohammed affæren, og som er interessant læsning, idet mange forskellige perspektiver og holdninger bliver bragt til torvs.

Første runde var overvejende pragmatisk, også fra Daniel Pipes’ side. I anden runde blev der gået mere til stålet af især Andrew C. McCarthy og Robert Spencer.

National Review’s egen holdning, som vel ligger tæt op ad min egen, gøres klar i en leder hvor det bl.a. lyder:

Muslim fanatics — those who aspire to be dictators, and those who already are —
have ginned up the controversy in order to gain power, or to keep it. They play
to the dull acquiescence of too many ordinary Muslims. But by no means all
Muslims are implicated in this shameful episode. Grand Ayatollah Sistani, leader
of Iraq's Shiites, "denounce[d] and condemn[ed]" the cartoons, but also blasted
"misguided and oppressive" Muslims who have "exploited" the issue "to spread
their poison and revive their old hatreds with new methods and mechanisms." When
President Bush declared, in his State of the Union address, that "liberty is the
future of every nation in the Middle East, because liberty is the right and hope
of all humanity," it was Sistani and millions of Muslims, in Iraq and elsewhere,
who agree with him, that he had in mind. The game for Muslim opinion is a tough
one. But it will surely be lost if we forfeit.

Dansk fornuft vs. fundamentalistisk vanvid

I Mellemøsten tiltager vanviddet nærmest minut for minut og det danske konsulater trues i dette øjeblik af en muslimsk menneskehob i Beirut. I den forbindelse er det interessant, at sammenligne reaktionerne i Mellemøsten med reaktionerne herhjemme. Her må man sige, at den almindelige danskers reaktion har været forbilledlig. Der har så vidt jeg kan fornemme været en solid opbakning bag ytringsfriheden, men forsvaret herfor er blevet fremført uden at ty til hadefulde verbale og/eller fysiske angreb på muslimer.

Selv muslimer som Abu Laban, der på skammeligste vis, har løjet sig igennem affæren, kan formentlig føle sig mere tryg i Danmark end en dansk turist i Damaskus. Der skal også lyde en sjælden ros herfra til Dansk Folkeparti, som igennem denne affære har undladt at piske en stemning op, men tværtimod forholdt sig nøgternt og køligt til vanviddet (forslaget om at udvise imamer der har skadet danske interesser vil jeg behandle i en senere post). Det siger tillige en hel del, at Dansk Front kun kunne mønstre 30 personer til deres demonstration i Hillerød.
Endelig er det lykkeligt, at se dannelsen af en forening af danske moderate muslimer, og at fremmødet var stort på trods af, at affæren netop i denne tid kulminerer.

Skal man endelig fæstne den kritiske finger på noget, så er det, at visse mennesker her i landet stadig er af den opfattelse, at JP, Statsministeren eller måske befolkningen som helhed, selv er skyld i den muslimske vrede og burde undskylde yderligere eller indlade sig på ”dialog”. Hvordan man går i dialog med en hob af nihilistiske fundamentalister uden at gå på kompromis med den frihed vi nyder her i landet er vist aldrig rigtig blevet anskueliggjort.

Noget af det bedste der er skrevet om hele Mohammed affæren er i mine øjne unge Johan Espersens tænksomme post på www.hairpin-bend.blogspot.com, som er en nydelse at læse.

Den (u)officielle amerikanske holdning

Det er bemærkelsesværdigt, at både Storbritannien og U.S.A. fra officielt hold har taget afstand fra JPs tegninger, idet disse lande har en tradition for ytringsfrihed der er længere og stærkere end den danske.

Weekly Standard har dog en artikel om tegningerne, som er mere klar i mælet, og som sandsynligvis afspejler den amerikanske regerings reelle holdning bedre end udtalelsen fra Foggy Bottom:

AS MOST OF THE WORLD now knows, on September 30, the Danish newspaper
Jyllands-Posten published twelve cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad.
Subsequent disputes have drawn in the Arab League, the Organization of the
Islamic Conference, the Council of Europe, the European Union, the World Trade
Organization, the United Nations, and Hezbollah, to name a few. Since not only
freedom of the press but also freedom of religion are threatened, it is vital to
be clear-sighted about the issues at stake.

[…]Defending freedom of
religion and freedom of the press requires distinguishing who is being
criticized, and distinguishing criticism from threats. It is one thing to
condemn Jyllands-Posten for offending millions of people. It is a very different
thing to criticize the Danish or other governments, since the criticism
itself, even apart from invidious calls for cartoonists to be punished by
the state, assumes that government should control the media. Saudi Arabia, Iran,
and their authoritarian brethren, as well as jihadist vigilantes, are attempting
to export and impose their media censorship and version of sharia on the world
at large, using economic pressure, international organizations, or
violence.

Hence, as Rasmussen correctly stated, he was sorry that Muslims
"felt insulted," but the Danish government"cannot be held responsible for what
is published in the independent media." Similarly, Norwegian prime minister Jens
Stoltenberg was sorry "this may have hurt many Muslims," but said the Norwegian
government "cannot apologize for what the newspapers print."

As a man of principle, Rasmussen should also tell the Egyptian and other ambassadors that
not only is this none of the Danish government's business, but, since they are
ambassadors of countries, not religions, it is none of their business either.
They, especially the Saudis, may reply that they do not make that distinction.
Our response should be to state clearly and firmly that we do, and that
protecting religious freedom requires us to uphold it in our dealings with
others.

Finally, amid current calls for "toleration" and "respect for
belief," we need to be very clear about the distinction between religious
toleration and religious freedom. Religious toleration means not insulting
somebody else's religion, and it is a good thing.

But religious freedom means being free to reject somebody else's religion and even to insult it. Government should want and encourage its citizens to be tolerant of one another, but its
primary responsibility is to protect its citizens' rights and freedoms. The fact
that people are sometimes insulted is one cost of freedom. The Jyllands-Posten
affair calls us to uphold that principle internationally as well as
domestically.

Artiklen adskiller på fin vis forskelle aspekter af debatten der til tider bliver forplumret af de stridende parters forskellige agendaer.

Hos Punditokraterne har Jørgen Møller i øvrigt startet en interessant diskussion om baggrunden for USA's og Storbritanniens udmeldinger, med udgangspunkt i idehistoriske forskelle mellem kontinental-Europa og de angel-saksiske lande.

Lys i mørket

I gårsdagens post gav jeg udtryk for et lønligt håb om, at vestlig principfasthed ville skabe omtanke og respekt hos de muslimer der endnu ikke er forblændet af fundamentalismens hærgen. I dagens JP kan man så læse, at den jordanske avis Al-shihan har valgt at trykke visse af de tegninger som Jyllands Posten bragte i september, inklusiv den tegning hvor Muhammeds turban er afbilledet som en bombe. Af avisens leder hedder det angiveligt:

- Muslimer i verden, vær fornuftige
- Hvad skader mest islam, disse
tegninger eller billeder af en gidseltager, der foran kameraer skærer halsen
over på sit offer, eller en selvmordsbomber, som sprænger sig selv i luften ved
et bryllup i Amman?

Det er netop den form for selvransagelse, som man kan håbe på konflikten medfører, og det må krævet mod at trykke billederne og skrive den leder, også selvom Jordan har varmere forbindelser til Vesten end Saudi-Arabien.

Martin Bielefeldt har i øvrigt gjort mig (og Punditokraternes læsere) opmærksom på en række blogs (her her her) skrevet af muslimer, for hvem frihed tilsyneladende betyder mere end religion (eller, for hvem disse størrelser måske kan gå hånd i hånd??). Disse blogs er opløftende fordi de tydeligt viser, at frihedsidealer har tiltrækningskraft, og at der blandt unge muslimer i hele verden ulmer en vrede mod de tanker, som desværre dominerer i store dele af den muslimske verden (læs f.eks. kommentarerne, der ligesom visse af disse kommentarer på Free Muslims debatforum, vidner om en bramfri hudløs debat som få associerer med Islam).

Det virker også som om en række danske muslimer har gjort op med sig selv, at valget mellem vestlige værdier og islamisk fundamentalisme i realiteten ikke er noget valg, hvis menneskelig værdighed, frihed, velstand og visdom ligger en på sinde. Det skal blive spændende at følge, hvad der kommer ud af lørdagens møde blandt moderate muslimer i Landstingssalen på Christiansborg.

Vestlig principfasthed

Jeg har sådan set ikke ændret mening vedrørende tegningerne, jeg tror de alene de blev bragt for provokationens skyld og jeg syn(t)es det var en studentikos handling. Men det må være enhvers ret at provokere og den voldsomme reaktion på tegningerne tyder på, at provokationen var tiltrængt.

I den forbindelse finder jeg det fantastisk glædeligt at se hvordan en helt række europæiske aviser nu vælger, at vise tegningerne, der blev bragt i Jyllandsposten. Jeg er af den overbevisning, at jo mere vi I vesten står ubetinget fast på vores frihedsrettigheder, jo bedre står vi rustet i kampen mod islamismen og om muslimske sjæle. Jeg har i et andet forum skrevet, at vestlig civilisation og frihed i mine øjne er en fordring til hver enkelt af os om bl.a. at udvise respekt for vores medmennesker deres ret til frihed om at tage ansvar for vore egne handlinger og liv om at forsøge at føre et produktivt liv uden at ligge andre til last og ikke at anvende vold eller trusler for at opnå vores mål. Denne fordring kræver, at vi hver især forsøger at leve op til disse idealer. Gør vi ikke det så forfalder vi til barbari. Det hjælper os ikke automatisk, at vi er født i den vestlige kulturkreds eller er kristne, det er ingen vaccine mod fanatisme, vold og terror. Derfor er det så vigtigt, at vi i både ord og handling står fast på egne idealer og troen på, at disse er andre overlegne, en overlegenhed som kun kan demonstreres ved at vi selv lever op til dertil. De sympatiserende avisers handlinger og civil courage er netop udtryk for en sådan efterlevelse af egne idealer. En sådan principfasthed må ryste enhver leder af et fundamentalistisk regime i langt højere grad end generel anti-muslimsk retorik eller trusler om magtanvendelse, som blot kan bruges i propaganda øjemed. En sådan principfasthed ansporer til selvstændig reflekteren og har en tiltrækningskraft der potentielt er ødelæggende for islamismen. Slår tanken om ytringsfrihed rod i bare én ud af 1000 saudi-arabere, palestinænsere, kuwaitere etc. har JPs handlinger været af uvurderlig betydning.


---oo0oo---

Når JP sagen er blæst over glæder jeg mig i øvrigt til at se om det passionerede forsvar for ytringsfriheden, som på glædelig vis synes at manifestere sig blandt store dele af den danske befolkning, særligt blandt de kultur-konservative, holder ved når konteksten ikke længere er vesten vs. Islam, samt om dette passionerede forsvar også vil blive udstrakt til øvrige klassiske (liberale) frihedsrettigheder, hvorfor ikke starte med alle frihedsrettigheders moder: den private ejendomsret.

Kollektiv psykose

Store dele af den arabiske verden er gået i selvsving over affæren med JP og Muhammed tegningerne (somjeg tidligere kort har omtalt her). Arla-ansatte er blevet udsat for fysiske angreb, Dannebrog afbrændes offentligt i Gaza-striben, danskere og Danmark udsættes for trusler om terror fra terroristorganisationer og danske virksomheder udsættes for omfattende boykot. Samtidig harcelerer arabiske stater, som Saudi-Arabien, Libyen, og Kuwait over den danske regerings manglende undskyldning, og de to førstnævnte lande har tilbagekaldt deres ambassadører. Der er endog tale om en FN-resolution med Danmark.

Kynismen hos disse mellemøstlige styrer, der aktivt udnytter JP sagen til at indsmigre sig hos de fundamentalister der truer deres magtbase, overgås kun af de samme staters hykleri.

Det amerikanske Udenrigsministerium udgiver hvert år ”Country reports on Human Rights Practices” og ”Country reports on Religious Freedom”, for hvert eneste af klodens lande (undtagen USA).

Af førstnævnte rapport vedrørende Saudi-Arabien fremgår det bl.a:

(Det skal for en god ordens skyld nævnes, at jeg har udeladt passager der tyder på, at der i det små er sket forbedringer i Saudi-Arabien, som også kan aflæses i Freedom House’s 2006 Global Survey)

The Government enforced most social and Islamic religious norms, the
Government's interpretations of which are matters of law (see Section 5). Women
may not marry noncitizens without government permission; men must obtain
government permission to marry noncitizen women outside the six states of the
Gulf Cooperation Council. In accordance with Shari'a, women are prohibited from
marrying non-Muslims; men may marry Christians and Jews, as well as Muslims.
Tradition and culture, not law, restrict marriages between Sunni and Shi'a
citizens, and the Government does not refuse marriage licenses between Sunni and
Shi'a couples

The Government owned and operated most domestic
television and radio companies. Government censors removed any reference to
politics, religions other than Islam, pork or pigs, alcohol, and sex from
foreign programs and songs. There were several million satellite-receiving
dishes in the country, which provided citizens with foreign television
programming.

Abuses of Freedom of Religion
During the period
covered by this report, the Government continued to commit abuses of religious
freedom. However, reports of abuses often are difficult or impossible to
corroborate. Fear and consequent secrecy surrounding any non-Muslim religious
activity contribute to reluctance to disclose any information that might harm
persons under government investigation. Moreover, information regarding
government practices is incomplete because judicial proceedings generally are
closed to the public, although the 2002 Criminal Procedural Law allows some
court proceedings to be open to the public.
Magic was widely believed in and
sometimes practiced; however, under the Government's interpretation of Shari'a,
the practice of magic was regarded as the worst form of polytheism, an offense
for which no repentance was accepted, and which was punishable by death. There
were an unknown number of detainees held in prison on the charge of "sorcery" or
the practice of "black magic" or "witchcraft." The press reported several cases
in which police arrested persons accused of sorcery, including a case in
September in which three African women were arrested in Jeddah. There were
reports of Shi'a Ismailis (Seveners) in Najran charged with practicing magic;
however, the Shi'a Ismailis maintained that their practice adheres to the
Seveners interpretation of Islam. There was no information available on prison
time or punishment.

There were reports that Christians were
detained for practicing their religion. During the year, there were scattered
raids, arrests, and detentions of Christians throughout the country, although
fewer than in the past. In February, the Government deported a resident
Christian after he provided an Arabic Bible to a citizen. In November, the
Government deported an Indian Christian arrested in April. There were credible
reports that Mutawwa'in arrested him for religious reasons after a dispute with
his employer. According to other reports, the Mutawwa'in beat him on the day of
the arrest and confiscated his personal property, including two Bibles, compact
disks, a personal computer, and religious videos.
Proselytizing by
non-Muslims, including the distribution of non-Muslim religious materials such
as Bibles, was illegal. Muslims or non-Muslims wearing religious symbols of any
kind in public risked confrontation with the Mutawwa'in.

Af sidstnævnte rapport fremgår det bl.a., at:

Freedom of religion does not exist. It is not recognized or protected under
the country's laws, and basic religious freedoms are denied to all but those who
adhere to the state-sanctioned version of Sunni Islam. Citizens are denied the
freedom to choose or change their religion, and noncitizens practice their
beliefs under severe restrictions. Islam is the official religion, and all
citizens must be Muslims. The Government limits the practice of all but the
officially sanctioned version of Islam and prohibits the public practice of
other religions. During the period covered by this report, the Government
publicly restated its policy that non-Muslims are free to practice their
religions at home and in private. While the Government does not always respect
this right in practice, many non-Muslims engage in private worship without
harassment

Hindus are considered polytheists by Islamic law, which
is used as a justification for greater discrimination in calculating accidental
death or injury compensation. According to the country's "Hanbali"
interpretation of Shari'a, once fault is determined by a court, a Muslim male
receives 100 percent of the amount of compensation determined, a male Jew or
Christian receives 50 percent, and all others (including Hindus and Sikhs)
receive 1/16 of the amount a male Muslim receives.

Under Shari'a,
conversion by a Muslim to another religion is considered apostasy, a crime
punishable by death if the accused does not recant. There were no executions for
apostasy during the period covered by this report, and there have been no
reports of such executions for several years. During the period covered by this
report, a schoolteacher was tried for apostasy, and eventually convicted in
March of blasphemy; the person was given a prison sentence of 3 years and 300
lashes. The trial received substantial press coverage.
The Government
prohibits public non-Muslim religious activities. Non-Muslim worshippers risk
arrest, imprisonment, lashing, deportation, and sometimes torture for engaging
in religious activity that attracts official attention. The Government has
stated publicly, including before the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in Geneva,
that its policy is to allow non-Muslim foreigners to worship privately. However,
the Government does not provide explicit guidelines--such as the number of
persons permitted to attend and acceptable locations--for determining what
constitutes private worship, which makes distinctions between public and private
worship unclear. This lack of clarity and instances of inconsistent enforcement
led many non-Muslims to worship in fear of harassment and in such a way as to
avoid discovery. The Government usually deported those detained for visible
non-Muslim worship after sometimes lengthy periods of arrest during
investigation. In some cases, they also were sentenced to receive lashes prior
to deportation.

The Government officially does not permit non-Muslim clergy to enter
the country to conduct religious services, although some come under other
auspices, and the Government generally has allowed their performance of discreet
religious functions. Such restrictions make it very difficult for most
non-Muslims to maintain contact with clergymen and attend services. Catholics
and Orthodox Christians, who require a priest on a regular basis to receive the
sacraments required by their faith, particularly are affected.

Under the provisions of Shari'a law as practiced in the country, judges
may discount the testimony of nonpracticing Muslims or of individuals who do not
adhere to the official interpretation of Islam. Legal sources report that
testimony by Shi'a is often ignored in courts of law or is deemed to have less
weight than testimony by Sunnis.
Customs officials routinely open mail and
shipments to search for contraband, including Sunni printed material deemed
incompatible with the Salafi tradition of Islam, Shi'a religious materials, and
non-Muslim materials, such as Bibles and religious videotapes. Such materials
are subject to confiscation, although rules appear to be applied arbitrarily.
Sunni Islamic religious education is mandatory in public schools at all
levels. Regardless of which Islamic tradition their families adhere to, all
public school children receive religious instruction that conforms to the Salafi
tradition of Islam. Non-Muslim students in private schools are not required to
study Islam. Private religious schools are not permitted for non-Muslims or for
Muslims adhering to non-Salafi traditions of Islam. Shi'a are banned from
teaching religion in schools.

Tegningerne af Muhammed, som vel at mærke blev bragt i en privatejet avis, er naturligvis på ingen måde sammenlignelig med den behandling den saudiske stat systematisk udsætter religiøse ”afvigere” for. En lang række af verdens stater fra Europa over Asien til Afrika kunne (og burde) med rette rejse en sønderlemmende kritik af Saudi-Arabiens totalitære religiøse undertrykkelse af deres statsborgere bosiddende i kongedømmet. Hvordan Saudi-Arabien med ovenstående fakta på bordet overhovedet tør stikke hovedet frem er en gåde.

Midt i denne deprimerende tid, er der dog tegn på, at den selvstændige tankevirksomhed har overlevet blandt visse mennesker i Mellemøsten, som visse af disse øjenvidneberetninger fra Danskere i området vidner om. Endvidere er det vel positivt, at den kollektive psykose (indtil videre) ikke har spredt sig til den øvrige muslimske verden, herunder stater baseret på en demokratisk styreform som Tyrkiet, Indonesien og Senegal, hvilket sandsynligvis siger en hel del om, at en øget grad af politisk og borgerlig frihed medfører en øget grad af tolerance og frisind (og humor).

Løftebrud

Jeg lovede i min seneste postering ikke at skrive mere om Islam-debatten i et stykke tid. Men her bare 6 dage efter mit løfte må jeg bryde det. Til mit forsvar skal det siges, at baggrunden for løftebruddet er glædelig, men jeg skal alligevel gøre det kort. JP bragte i tirsdags 49 almindelig muslimers holdninger til torvs. Ingen rasende imamer, fatwaer eller lignende, blot ganske almindelige mennesker, som tillige er muslimer. JP havde desuden en fornuftig leder i gårsdagens udgave. At sådanne tiltag har virkning kunne ses allerede blandt dagens læserbreve, der jo ellers overvejende har et noget andet indhold. Hatten af for JP, som jeg ellers har været lidt efter. Det ser ud til at JP ikke længere spiller blindt med på den kultur-konservative agenda, hvor religion og kultur opfattes som fuldstændigt absolutte størrelser, som opvejer og går forud for hensynet til individdet.

Kan man i øvrigt finde JPs leder eller artikel på Polemiken, Minut, Uriasposten eller Angantyr? Gæt selv kære læser.

Mere optimisme

I gårsdagens postering henviste jeg til et af Ronald Reagans yndlingscitater:

"you can go to live in France but you cannot become a Frenchman, you can go to Germany but cannot become a German[...]But anyone from any corner of the worldcan come to live in America and become American."

At den indstilling der underlægger citatet har spillet en afgørende rolle for den grad af loyalitet mod USA som også mange muslimske indvandrere føler, demonstreres i praksis af et par vigtige organisationer (der ikke står alene). Jeg har ofte henvist til Freemuslims. Men også American Islamic Forum for Democracy (AIFD) er værd at bemærke. AIFDs founding principles lyder som følger:

Mission: We proud citizens of the United States of America join together
as devoted and patriotic citizens and as devout Muslims in this forum in order
to serve as a vehicle for the discussion and public awareness of the complete
compatibility of America’s founding principles with the very personal faith of
Islam which we practice.
Core Principles and Goals:

1) To be a voice of

Muslim American citizenry in strong support of the following:

a) The devout practice of Islam and the Islamic concept of consultation and
consent (shura) as being wholly compatible with the American form of
democracy

b) The support of the separation of religion and
state as being perfectly non-contradictory with Koranic principles.

c) As United States citizens we support our American armed forces.

d) As United States citizens we support absolute and literal adherence to
our citizenship pledge.

e) We support our American interests,
domestic and foreign.

2) To raise the public consciousness regarding
the core principles above and the following additional goals and
beliefs:

a) We will promote tolerance in Islam as being a
fundamental principle of the Holy Koran.

i) We recognize the fact that there are no clergy in Islam and we accept the Koran as
our main reference for discussions regarding our faith.

ii) We as a group in recognition of democratic principles believe
that each Muslim is equally entitled to their opinion concerning the religion of
Islam.

b) We will work to educate the public regarding the
existence of a special relationship between Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam.

c) We will work to educate the public regarding the
current threat to America of radicals who exploit Islam through
militancy.

d) We explicitly refuse to acknowledge the
justification of any form of terrorism (the targeting of civilians and
non-combatants).

e) We believe in that religion is a matter for
individual beliefs without any role for the direct involvement of religion in
government.

f) We believe in the equality of the sexes which is
well established in the Koran.

g) We will work to promote and
enhance the understanding of Islam in America.

h) We will work
to express the consistency of the principles of Islam with economic principles
of free markets and capitalism.

i) We will work to promote and
enhance the education of Muslims in their history and development as it relates
to American democracy and freedom.

j) We will work to promote
the appreciation of the integral role of American patriotism and nationalism in
the life of Muslim youth in America.

k) We will work to
stimulate the principles which bring about increased understanding and
involvement of American Muslim citizens in American life

l) We will work to formulate expressions of positions on specific areas of American
foreign and domestic policy as they relate to American interests and as relevant
to the discussion of Islam and democratic principles

m) While as Muslims and American citizens we will take stands on many of the diverse foreign policy positions of our government, we feel it is necessary to make a
foundational position statement regarding the state of Israel. We stand in
support of the existing unqualified recognition of the state of Israel behind
internationally recognized borders.

n) We also separately stand in recognition of the need for the completion of the
formation of an independent Palestinian state on the current “occupied
territories” living side by side next to the established state of Israel.

Organisationer som AIFD og Free Muslims understreger klart behovet for at skelne mellem muslimer og bedømme det enkelte individ på dets handlinger og ord, ikke dets religiøse tilhørsforhold. Dette burde være naturligt for borgerlige, når man tænker på socialismens absurde opdelinger af mennesker i klasser og de blodige konsekvenser deraf. Men ak, der er desværre stadig ”socialists in all parties”, hvorfor der stadig er god grund til ikke at være konservativ.

En person der formår at skelne mellem fundamentalister og almindelige muslimer uden at ty til apologi, er Stephen Schwartz, der på Techcentralstation, har skrevet en glimrende artikel kaldet ”What is a moderate muslim?”.

Schwartz skriver bl.a.:

As we enter 2006, Islamic radicalism remains no less a challenge to the
world than it did four years ago. One of its chief aspects involves how
non-Muslims, who typically have little knowledge of Islam, may accurately
identify Muslim moderates.

Muslim moderation is defined by attitudes and
conduct, not by abstractions or historical precedents, which, as with all
religions, may be interpreted to support any ideological position. Observing and
analyzing Sunni Muslims by such positive, practical criteria is extremely easy.
There are more than a billion Sunnis in the world, and they are not all
jihadists or fundamentalists, so telling them apart should not be difficult with
a little effort. Identifying moderate Shia Muslims is harder, but one thing may
be said immediately: those who follow Ayatollah Ali Sistani in Iraq prove their
moderation daily, by their silent but effective support to the U.S.-led
liberation coalition.

[…]It seems unnecessary to add that those who
try to disclaim a link between Wahhabism and al-Qaida, or who blame al-Qaida on
American machinations, cannot be considered moderates. If a Sunni denies that
Wahhabism exists by saying “there is only Islam,” or tries to cover Wahhabism
with an ameliorative term like “Salafism” -- a fraudulent effort to equate
Wahhabism with the pioneers of the Islamic faith -- the individual is an
extremist. Such a radical will not, under any circumstances, declare his or her
opposition to Wahhabism per se. They may even claim that the whole concept was
invented by Westerners such as myself.
A parallel example may be cited from
the history of Communism. Stalinist Communists would repudiate the charge that
they were Communists, calling themselves progressives, liberals, or socialists.
They would deny that Communism intended anything malign toward the U.S.,
portraying America as an aggressor (something Islamists and Stalinists have in
common) but nonetheless claiming loyalty to it. They would often argue over
whether Stalinism even existed. And they would never denounce Stalin, even
though the entire planet knew about the atrocities of the Soviet regime. Neither
will Islamist radicals denounce Wahhabism.

Moderate Muslims may also be
identified by what they do not do, to contrast them with radicals. And at the
top of that list comes the practice of takfir, or declaring Muslims unbelievers
over differences of opinion. Takfir also includes describing the ordinary,
traditional Muslim majority in the world as having fallen into unbelief.
Takfir is used to justify the radical Sunni massacres of Shia Muslims in
Iraq. It underpins the ideology of the Saudi-Wahhabi sect, the extremist Sunni
Islamic Brotherhood in Egypt, and the bloodthirsty Sunni jihadist movements in
Pakistan. It also serves to bind together Muslim extremists through the illusion
that they belong to a purified elite. Islam is not, and never was, a radical or
fundamentalist religion in its mainstream practice, regardless of the fantasies
of Islamist fanatics and Islamophobes alike.

Moderate Muslims do not engage
in takfir. Shias shun takfir, including radical Shias, and Shias fighting
against Sunnis who persecute them do not practice takfir against their foes.
Enemies of terrorist Wahhabis do not accuse them of unbelief, but of
criminality. Traditional Muslims avoid accusations of unbelief, as they were
counseled to do by the Prophet Muhammad. The Prophet never anticipated that
Muslims would fall into unbelief.
Moderate Muslims, including Shias as well
as Sunnis, also do not refer to followers of other religions, especially Jews
and Christians, Zoroastrians, Hindus, and Buddhists, as unbelievers. The Koran
never refers to Jews and Christians as unbelievers, but as People of the Book,
worthy of respect and protection. Moderate Muslims adhere strictly to this
outlook.

[..]Moderate Muslims also do not reject allegiance to non-Muslim
governments. According to current interpretations of Shafi’i sharia, a major
school of Islamic jurisprudence through history, there are no countries where
Muslims are not required to obey local governments, for the security of their
communities. Moderate Muslims do not proclaim public loyalty to such governments
while privately counseling that Western governments are inferior to Muslim
religious decrees. They do not invent civil rights violations as a political
means of fighting Western authorities. Moderate Muslims recognize that Muslims
have more rights and opportunities for advancement in most Western countries
than in most Muslim lands.
Finally, moderate Muslims are not Arabocentric or
trapped in the rhetoric of Pakistan and elsewhere in the Indian subcontinent.
They recognize that the styles, idioms, and spiritual practices of Islam differ
considerably from Mali to Malaysia and from Bosnia to Botswana. Moderate Muslims
accept that such diversity should also exist among Muslims in the West; that
there can and will be an Islam that is fully American in its culture, as
Bosnians and Indonesians reflect the customs and cultures of their
lands.

[…]Is the Islamic establishment in the U.S. -- the Council on
American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA),
and the Muslim Students Association of the U.S. and Canada (MSA) -- moderate?
No, it is not. Not one of these three groups has ever identified or criticized a
Muslim radical in the U.S., except to slander authentic moderates by trying to
portray them as extremists. To cite a few notable examples: the aforementioned
organizations, which I have called “the Wahhabi lobby.”

Jeg vil i øvrigt bestræbe mig på, at skrive om andet end Islam i det næste stykke tid. Debatten hænger mig rent faktisk ud af halsen. Men når nu så få borgerlige her i landet er tro mod egne principper når det kommer til dette emne, har det optaget mig en del. Der er rent faktisk mange andre emner, der interesserer mig langt mere og dem vil jeg søge at dyrke mere. Lars Hvidberg og jeg arbejder i øvrigt på et nyt koncept, som forhåbenligt bliver endog rigtigt spændende. Men mere om det på et andet tidspunkt...

Borgerligt lys i udlændingedebatten

Det ser ud som om, der blandt visse borgerlige politikere er sket et holdningsskifte i indvandrerdebatten og at man begynder at indse, at det at lægge sig i Dansk Folkepartis slipstrøm udover at bryde med klassiske borgerlige dyder såsom respekt for individet, tillige er ufrugtbart.

Peter Norsk har været en kærkommen stemme i JPs endeløse række af forudsigelige læserbreve og debatindlæg, hvor MUSLIMERNE i Danmark i selvretfærdige toner får læst og påskrevet om hvor tilbagestående, intolerante og samfundsskadelige de alle er.

Peter Norsk påpeger, ligesom jeg selv har gjort, at integration af muslimer rent faktisk i høj grad er lykkedes i U.S.A. :

Det er der to væsentlige grunde til: For det første, at man i USA har lov at
leve, som man vil med den religion og den påklædning, man nu en gang ønsker,
således at alle borgere føler sig respekteret af det omgivende samfund, og for
det andet, at udbetaling af sociale ydelser er begrænsede, således at man i
højere grad end i Danmark er tvunget til at arbejde.
Derfor er den bedste
integrationspolitik simpel: 1) Udvis respekt over for alle borgere uanset deres
etniske og religiøse baggrund, 2) ansæt i højere grad borgere med indvandrer- og
flygtningebaggrund i både private og offentlige stillinger og 3) begræns mest
muligt de passive overførselsindkomster.
Respekt og arbejde er den cocktail,
som vil mindske integrationsproblemerne.

Peter Norsk har med forslag 1 og 3 ramt ned i kernen af hvad, der skal til for at ændre på tilstandene herhjemme. Et af Ronald Reagans yndlingscitater som han ofte brugte ved offentlige lejligheder vedrørte netop indvandring:

"you can go to live in France but you cannot become a Frenchman, you can go to
Germany but cannot become a German[...]But anyone from any corner of the world
can come to live in America and become American."

Der er (uden sammenligning i øvrigt) lidt af Reagans ukuelige positive tone i Norsks indlæg, som gør godt midt i den negative strøm.

Forslag 2 som jeg læser som en opfordring til indførsel af positiv særbehandling kan jeg derimod ikke bifalde. Man skal som ”gammel dansker” naturligvis ikke straffes for sin herkomst således, at ringere kvalificerede indvandrere ansættes på bekostning af bedre kvalificerede gammel danskere. Dette ville netop bryde med princippet, om at præmissen for at indvandre hertil er at man klarer sig selv på lige vilkår med alle andre. På denne måde fjernes tillige en del af grobunden for modvilje overfor indvandrere, hvoraf en stor gruppe jo i dagens Danmark unægteligt belaster de offentlige kasser

Netop denne forståelse virker som kernen i et forslag, som Søren Pind og Irene Simonsen fra Venstre netop har offentliggjort, og ifølge hvilket velkvalificerede indvandrere skal have lov til at komme til landet for at søge arbejde. Forslaget virker rent faktisk til at være blevet vel modtaget på Christiansborg (med undtagelse af DF selvfølgelig).

Ovenstående formel (minus Norsks forslag 2) der ville søge at modvirke de værste konsekvenser af indvandring samtidig med at velfærdsstaten blev formindsket burde tiltrække borgerlige i langt højere grad end konfrontationskurs med et stort mindretal.

Frihed vinder terræn i Mellemøsten

I slutningen af december 2005 udgav den amerikanske NGO Freedom House deres Global Survey for 2006. Freedom House rapporter er værd at læse fordi de modsat andre NGOer indenfor demokratisering og menneskerettigheder alene kæmper for det liberale demokrati og klassiske negative frihedsrettigheder, ikke social retfærdighed i form af positive socio-økonomiske rettigheder. Freedom House’s rapporter er ligeledes fri for den ulidelige politiske korrekthed parret med anti-amerikansk og anti-kapitalistisk retorik, der præger typiske NGO’er indenfor samme område.

2006 rapporten er især bemærkelsesværdig fordi den vidner om små men signifikante landvindinger for frihed i Mellemøsten. Af rapporten fremgår det bl.a.:

The global survey, "Freedom in the World," shows that although the Middle East
continues to lag behind other regions, a measurable improvement can be seen in
freedom in several key Arab countries, as well as the Palestinian Authority. In
another key finding, the number of countries rated by Freedom House as Not Free
declined from 49 in 2004 to 45 for the year 2005, the lowest number of Not Free
societies identified by the survey in over a decade. In noteworthy country
developments, Ukraine and Indonesia saw their status improve from Partly Free to
Free; Afghanistan moved from Not Free to Partly Free; and the Philippines saw
its status decline from Free to Partly Free.

According to Thomas O. Melia, acting executive director of Freedom House, "The modest but heartening advances in the Arab Middle East result from activism by citizen groups and reforms by governments in about equal measures. This emerging trend reminds us that men and women in this region share the universal desire to live in free societies."
"As we welcome the stirrings of change in the Middle East," said
Mr. Melia, "it is equally important that we focus on the follow-through in other
regions and appreciate the importance of the continuing consolidation of
democracy in Indonesia, Ukraine, and other nations.

[…]Although the countries
of the Middle East lag behind other regions in areas such as adherence to
democratic standards, independent media, the rights of women, and the rule of
law, the past year witnessed modest positive trends. Lebanon experienced the
most significant improvement; its status improved from Not Free to Partly Free
due to major improvements in both political rights and civil liberties that
followed the withdrawal of Syrian occupation forces. Elections exhibiting
increased competition in Iraq, Egypt, and the Palestinian territories; the
introduction of women's suffrage in Kuwait; and improvements in Saudi Arabia's
media environment are among other encouraging signs in the region.”

Det er også værd at bemærke at verdens folkerigeste muslimske land Indonesien er gået fra at være "partly free" til "free". Indonesien er altså mere frit end en række kristne latin-amerikanske lande såsom Ecuador, Colombia, Paraguay, og interessant nok også friere end europæiske Rusland.

Som jeg også har skrevet om på Punditokraterne er der altså grund til at nære optimisme med hensyn til udbredelsen af basale frihedsrettigheder i den muslimske verden. Bevares, der er lang vej igen og udviklingen kan vende, men som den amerikanske konservative debattør Michael Novak, citerende Solzhenitsyn, udtalte det i sin åbningstale til the “Hayek Lecture”: "the idea of truth is more powerful than all the arms in the world, and what he [Solzhenitsyn] wrote seemed in 1977 so unlikely of realization - and yet we saw the Soviet tanks halt before flowers held by civilians in 1991."

Talen der i høj grad omhandler hvad der taler henholdsvis for og imod det liberale demokratis udbredelse i muslimske lande er i øvrigt interessant læsning og, dybt kristne og konservative, Novak konkluderer, at der en grund til behersket optimisme. Hvis bare danske kultur-konservative udviste samme tro på de grundlæggende idealer som de kritiserer muslimske lande for at mangle. Men man skal nok ikke regne med at se Freedom House’s rapport citeret på Uriasposten, Polemikken, Angantyr, Filtrat, Minut eller de øvrige kultur-konservative blogs, hvor den negative automatpilot er sat til og ensidigheden (med ganske få undtagelser) råder frit.

Liberalisme i praksis

I Weekendavisen kan man læse en forfriskende artikel om Estland og den frie økonomi, som hersker der. Artiklen kan ikke helt slippe den lidt ironiske og overbærende tone som danske medier ofte anlægger når det handler om den ”åndløse og materialistiske” liberalisme og kapitalisme. Artiklen undlader heller ikke at fortælle, at uligheden er stor mellem rig og fattig i Estland, men man får til gengæld ikke at vide hvad gennemsnitsindkomsten for en fattig ester er. Mon ikke den er højere end i nogle af de omgivende lande, hvor ligheden bliver tvangshåndhævet af politikere?
På trods af ovenstående kan artiklen ikke skjule, at Estland er en solstrålehistorie og den bramfrie måde politikerne omtaler problemer såsom bureaukratiseringen og centralisering i EU, skatteprocenter og overførselsindkomster på kan man som dansker kun misunde, når man er vant til vores hjemlige politikere, der får nervøse trækninger så snart der stilles spørgsmål ved velfærdsstaten. Her lidt pluk fra Artiklen skrevet, der er af Klaus Wivel:

Da Sovjetunionen kollapsede i 1991, var Estland en socialistisk ruin, og her
kunne nationen være gået i stå i salvelsesfuld national selvretfærdighed og søgt
sympati hos omverdenen for de mange års brutale kolonisering. Andre lande, ingen
nævnt, alle glemt, bruger stadig et kolonistyre, som ikke har været der i
årtier, som undskyldning for det forfald, de er havnet i.De kunne også have
ladet en korrupt tyran tage over. Man skal ikke særlig langt syd eller øst på,
til Hviderusland eller ja, Rusland, før skræmmeeksemplerne springer op ad æsken.
Ikke engang ’den orange revolution’ i Ukraine ser ud til at have ført landet ud
af sumpen. Esterne ved godt, at det kunne have set meget anderledes ud.I
stedet... ja, i stedet har esterne bygget dette pragtværk af en mall, åbent til
sent lørdag aften, åbent til sent søndag aften, imødekommende og grimt, ingen
arkitektonisk lir, men masser af gode tilbud, alt hvad du behøver, demokrati og
kapitalisme for fuld udblæsning.»Når Estland er det af det tidligere østlande,
der klarer sig bedst, skyldes det to ting: De finske turister, som står for over
en tredjedel af vores økonomi. Og den ekstremt liberale økonomi. Estland har opbygget en nation, der er et omvendt spejlbillede af det kommunistiske.«

I dag kalder liberale tænketanke Estland for et af de økonomisk set frieste lande i verden, helt sikkert det frieste i EU. Da Sovjet faldt, blev 90 procent af alle
statslige virksomheder privatiseret, og man skal ikke betale skat, hvis man vil
investere i firmaer. Derfor er der mange udenlandske forretninger, som slår sig
ned i Estland, og Tallinn har da også fået sin del af spritnye høje
spejlglasbygninger i mærkelige trekantede former, som åbenbart er obligatoriske
for enhver by i vækst.Esterne har en skatteprocent på 24, den såkaldte »flade
skat«, som flere andre østeuropæiske lande har indført. Det vil sige, at moms,
indkomstskat, osv. er den samme - man betaler ikke procentvis mere i skat, jo
mere man tjener.

Toldtariffer og andre hindringer for udenlandsk handel er blevet fjernet, et andet internationalt særsyn. Samtidig blev det nationale budget holdt, og arbejdsløsheden er i dag nede på syv procent. Estland var det første baltiske land, som overholdt de krav, EU havde sat for medlemskab

Da overmagten forsvandt, stod Estland med en lang række
politikere og embedsmænd, som var gamle og dovne. De talte russisk og tænke
sovjetisk - det, de kunne, var der ingen, der havde brug for. Det stik modsatte
var påkrævet: Man skulle kunne tale europæisk og tænke amerikansk. Det blev de
unge i 20rne og begyndelsen af 30rne, som fik poster som ministre, borgmestre og
bankdirektører. For dem var statsmagten ikke nødvendigvis nogen godgørende
forening. De byggede bankvæsnet op fra grunden, reformerede økonomien til
ukendelighed og stablede en hær på benene. Ironien er, at det ikke bliver
Rusland, som sætter en stopper for himmelfarten. Det bliver Gamle Europa.»Efter
vi er kommet med i EU, vil det hele nok gå lidt langsommere igen, for vi behøver
ikke længere være så paranoide over, om russerne skulle finde på at besætte os
igen.

«De unge estere ser på EU på samme måde som briterne. De går ikke ind for
et stærkt EU, og de ønsker, at landbrugsstøtten skal fjernes.»Det er paradokset:
Vi ønskede brændende at blive en del af EU, men nu ser vi, at unionen kan skade
vores økonomi og trække os i en mere socialistisk retning. EU har kun en vækst
på 2-3 procent, men vores for øjeblikket er mellem dobbelt og fem gange så
høj.Vi fatter ikke, hvorfor EU smider så mange penge efter landbruget. Det
smadrer jo markedet. Og nu bliver også vi nødt til at tage imod EU-penge til
landbruget. Indtil nu har vi været det eneste øst-europæiske land, som ikke har
subsidieret vores landbrug.«For Lauri Luiki er der faldet en stor skygge ind
over udsigten til et endnu mere liberalt Estland.»For tre år siden var jeg
svoren tilhænger af EU-medlemskab, men i dag er jeg kommet stærkt i tvivl. Det
er jo helt vildt, så bureaukratisk EU er, så langsommelig. Vi er ved at bevæge
os i en mere socialistisk retning, og det er EUs skyld - selv inden for vores
eget parti er man begyndt at slække på ideologien. I Estland skal man ikke
betale skat, hvis man vil investere i virksomheder, men det er forbudt ifølge
EU, og fra 2009 er vi tvunget til at ændre den lov.«Jeg fortæller ham om Søren
Pinds 10 teser - de teser, en gruppe liberale i Venstre omkring Københavns nu
tidligere borgmester lavede for et par år siden. En af teserne var blandt andet,
at skatten i Danmark ikke skulle overstige 50 procent. Anders Fogh Rasmussens
reaktion var nådesløs: Gruppen blev totalt frosset ud.Lauri Luiki ser forarget
på mig:»Det er jo sindssygt. Der kunne jeg ikke tænke på at bo. Hvorfor er
mennesker, der tjener penge, suspekte? Hvorfor skal de betale så meget? Mon ikke
vi hver især bedst selv ved, hvad vores penge skal gå til?«

Paavo Pärn tager over:»Vores overbevisninger er stærke, fordi vi ved, hvad vi ikke vil have. Og vores liberale ideer har vist sig at bære frugt. Vi vil undgå de fejl, de
europæiske velfærdsdemokratier har begået. I Europa er der masser af mennesker,
som ikke arbejder, fordi det ikke kan betale sig. Understøttelsen er simpelt hen
for høj.«»Hvorfor er det gået Moldova dårligt og Estland godt? Det er aldrig
lykkedes for Moldova at slippe af med sit kommunistiske regime efter
Sovjetunionens fald. I dag er Moldova nøjagtig samme sted, som Estland var for
15 år siden. Det er gamle, korrupte mennesker, der bestyrer landet -
præsidentens søn er for eksempel den rigeste forretningsmand i landet. Den
politiske elite har ikke villet privatisere, og de har ikke villet forynge den
politiske elite.«

Estlands eksempel er væsentligt at huske på, når liberale får skudt i skoene, at liberalismen fører til den sociale massegrav, er irrelevant i postindustrielle videnssamfund eller er udtryk for abstrakt utopi på linje med socialismen hvis indførelse vil medføre samfundets undergang. Freedom matters!

Endelig

Endelig! I weekendavisen kan man læse, at en gruppe danske muslimer inspireret af Naser Khader, vil skabe et netværk, der skal søge at skabe et mere billede af danske muslimer end det der typisk gengives i danske medier. Altså et opgør med Abu Laban, Wahid Petersen og alle de andre kvart, halv eller hel fundamentalister, som normalt får lov til at tegne danske muslimer i offentligheden. Der er et skrigende behov for sådanne initiativer i Europa, og det bliver forhåbentligt et godt eksempel på hvorledes nogle få menneskers initiativ kan føre positive forandringer med sig.

Det er interessant at notere sig at initiativet er blevet forbigået i tavshed på Uriasposten, Filtrat og Minut. Det gør det jo unægtelig lidt svært at tage den daglige forargelse disse blogs (nogle gange med rette) udgyder over ensidigheden af mediernes dækning af Islam og udlændingepolitikken alvorligt.

To politikere ved navn Khan

I forlængelse af mit debatindlæg i JP og debatten på Punditokraterne om konsekvenserne af indvandring i hhv USA og Europa er følgende lille historie meget betegnende. I Danmark har vi en muslimsk indvandrerpolitiker ved Navn Wallaith Khan. Udover at være særdeles illoyal har han tillige givet udtryk for sympati overfor ekstremistiske muslimske organisationer.

I U.S.A. har man også en muslimsk politiker ved navn (Arif) Khan. Khan er rent faktisk det Libertarianske partis kandidat til senator for Wisconsin. Khans politiske budskaber kan læses ud af følgende interview:

“It is time to reign the government back within the confines of the
Constitution,”
Although public funds are available for candidates, Khan has
refused to make use of them, something that both major-party candidates have
readily done. He emphasizes the grass-roots element of his campaign, in
contrast to those of his opponents. “One of the things that we are trying
to do is to not be like everyone else,” Khan says. “We are not going to
pander to special interests or be beholden to anyone who gave us money.”
Khan believes that the government is too large, and thinks that America
needs to look inward, rather than outward, in order to get back to what the
writers of the Constitution had intended. “It takes 67 percent of the
national budget just to run the government, its so big” he says. “This is
why the deficit is so high.”

He cites the removal of U.S. troops from stations abroad as his first
order of business, should he be elected. “I would foster cordial
relationships with other countries, not tangling alliances,” he says of his
foreign policy. “We are not responsible for the rest of the world.
My allegiance is to defend the United States, not to police other
countries.”
Khan also emphasizes his desire to repeal the PATRIOT Act, a law
that he views as “totally unconstitutional.” Furthermore, he would improve
education in the country, noting that the United States has fallen to 29th in
the world ranking in science among students, from first in the 1960’s, and that
young people’s command of language has decreased as well. “[Students]
don’t know the difference between verbs and adverbs,” Khan says.

Khan offers voters an option of change from what he sees as a trend of
war and deficit spending.
“They are going to continue to tax us more and pass
unconstitutional laws,” Khan says. “If this is what you want, vote for my
opponents.”

I modsætning til Wallaith Khan har Arif Khan ikke brug for to tunger, en til sit pakistanske bagland og en til den brede offentlighed. Her kan læses om et møde mellem Khan og muslimske forretningsfolk i Wisconsin, hvor af det bla. fremgår, at:

“The members of the Muslim Professional Association, who have yet to endorse a
candidate for U.S. senator or president, enjoyed hearing from the Libertarian
candidates.
"I just recently became a U.S. citizen and I can't wait to make
my first vote Libertarian," said Umar Akram, a college student whose family
moved from Pakistan to the United States in 1997.
Akram was one of the more
than 25 attendees who requested more information regarding the Libertarian Party
and its candidates.
Libertarian National Committee member Jeremy Keil said he
was amazed at the excitement the Libertarian candidates generated.
"The
Muslim professionals I spoke with have a deep love for this country and a deep
love of freedom," he said. "But they want their voice heard. They were excited
that the Libertarians are reaching out to their community and feel that we may
become their voice in politics.
"If we as a party can help empower the Muslim
community through the political process, we can build a foundation for reaching
out to other constituencies, such as small business owners, that are politically
active and believe in Libertarian ideals."
Richard Campagna said he was
delighted to spend the afternoon campaigning with Khan.
"As a Muslim small
businessman, Arif Khan knows that government is often at odds with both Muslims
and small business owners," he said. "His campaign for Senate will reach out to
these constituencies and be their voice in the political arena. I look forward
to more campaign trips to Wisconsin as we reach out to communities that agree
with the Libertarian Party and are willing to help build a party that will
empower them."
The Libertarian Party could be Muslim Americans' ticket to
changing the way they are viewed in America, Khan said.
"It is incumbent upon
all Muslims to dispel the myth that we are all terrorists and war mongers and
butchers as portrayed by the media," he said. "I think the only party capable of
doing that is the Libertarian Party, since we are the only ones actually willing
to listen and pay attention and then do the sensible thing."

I det muslimske miljø er der således ikke bare opbakning til U.S.As grundlæggende værdier om individual frihed, hersker der tilsyneladende også en følelse af, at hver enkelt muslim har ansvar for at lægge afstand til fundamentalisme og tyranni. Holdninger der desværre står i grel kontrast til den indadvendthed og offermentalitet der præger mange europæiske muslimer.
Mon ikke situationen i Europa ville være sammenlignelig hvis vi gik mere op i frihed end tryghed?

Frankrig II

Jeg har et længere læserbrev i dagens JP omhandlende situationen i Frankrig. Det skal tilføjes at overskriften er valgt af JP ikke af mig.

Frankrig

Optøjerne i Frankrig har givet anledning til mange skriverier om årsagerne dertil. Venstrefløjen ser dem typisk som udtryk for et mere eller mindre racistisk Frankrig, hvorfor løsningen må være mere målrettet offentligstøtte til de misforståede unge. For de kulturkonservative er optøjerne derimod bekræftelsen på, at indvandring, især fra muslimske lande, uundgåeligt medfører konflikt og samfundets sammenbrud (visse er endda gået så langt at sammenligne optøjerne med en intifada).

Ikke overraskende er det i (klassisk) liberale medier såsom Wall Street Journal og the Economist, at de mere nøgterne og velargumenterede forsøg på forklaringer findes. Forklaringer som især venstrefløjens men også de kulturkonservative givetvis vil have svært ved at gendrive.

I Wall Street Journals leder af i fredags kaldet ”How to create a Muslim underclass” hedder det bl.a.:

The first thing that needs illuminating is that, while the overwhelming majority
of rioters are Muslim, it is premature at best to describe the rioting as an
"intifada" or some other term denoting religiously or culturally inspired
violence. And it is flat-out wrong to claim that the rioting is a consequence of
liberal immigration policies.
Consider the contrast with the U.S. Between
1978 and 2002, the percentage of foreign-born Americans nearly doubled, to 12%
from 6.2%. At the same time, the five-year average unemployment rate declined to
5.1% from 7.3%. Among immigrants, median family incomes rose by roughly $10,000
for every 10 years they remained in the country.
These statistics hold
across immigrant groups, including ones that U.S. nativist groups claim are
"unassimilable." Take Muslims, some two million of whom live in America.
According to a 2004 survey by Zogby International, two-thirds are immigrants,
59% have a college education and the overwhelming majority are middle-class,
with one in three having annual incomes of more than $75,000. Their
intermarriage rate is 21%, nearly identical to that of other religious groups.
It's true that France's Muslim population--some five million out of a total
of 60 million--is much larger than America's. They also generally arrived in
France much poorer. But the significant difference between U.S. and French
Muslims is that the former inhabit a country of economic opportunity and social
mobility, which generally has led to their successful assimilation into the
mainstream of American life. This has been the case despite the best efforts of
multiculturalists on the right and left to extol fixed racial, ethnic and
religious identities at the expense of the traditionally adaptive, supple
American one.
In France, the opposite applies. Mass Muslim migration to
France began in the 1960s, a period of very low unemployment and industrial
labor shortages. Today, French unemployment is close to 10%, or double the U.S.
rate. Unlike in the U.S., French culture eschews multiculturalism and puts a
heavy premium on the concept of "Frenchness." Yet that hasn't provided much
cushion for increasingly impoverished and thus estranged Muslim communities,
which tend to be segregated into isolated and generally unpoliced suburban
cities called banlieues. There, youth unemployment runs to 40%, and crime, drug
addiction and hooliganism are endemic.
This is not to say that Muslim
cultural practices are irrelevant. For Muslim women especially, the misery of
the banlieues is compounded by a culture of female submission, often violently
enforced. Nor should anyone rule out the possibility that Islamic radicals will
exploit the mayhem for their own ends. But whatever else might be said about the
Muslim attributes of the French rioters, the fact is that the pathologies of the
banlieues are similar to those of inner cities everywhere. What France suffers
from, fundamentally, is neither a "Muslim problem" nor an "immigration problem."
It is an underclass problem.
French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin
almost put his finger on the problem when he promised to introduce legislation
to ease the economic plight of the banlieues. But aside from the useful
suggestion of "enterprise zones," most of the legislation smacked of
big-government solutions: community centers, training programs and so on.
The larger problem for the prime minister is that France's underclass is a
consequence of the structure of the French economy, in which the state accounts
for nearly half of gross domestic product and roughly a quarter of employment.
French workers, both in the public and private sectors, enjoy GM-like benefits
in pensions, early retirement, working hours and vacations, sick- and maternity
leave, and job security--all of which is militantly enforced by strike-happy
labor unions. The predictable result is that there is little job turnover and
little net new job creation. Leave aside the debilitating effects of
unemployment insurance and welfare on the underclass: Who would employ them if
they actually sought work?

Og løsningen:

For France, the good news is that these problems can be solved, principally be
deregulating labor markets, reducing taxes, reforming the pension system and
breaking the stranglehold of unions on economic life. The bad news is the
entrenched cultural resistance to those solutions--not on the part of angry
Muslim youth, but from the employed half of French society that refuses to
relinquish their subsidized existences for the sake of the "solidarity" they
profess to hold dear. So far, most attempts at reform have failed, mainly due to
a combination of union militancy and political timidity.

The Economist skriver:

A much greater contributor than Islam to the
malaise in the suburbs is the lack of jobs. Mr Chirac promised in 1995 that
unemployment would be his top priority, an assertion repeated ten years on by
his new prime minister, Dominique de Villepin, when he took office last May. It
is here, not in esoteric disputes over different models of assimilation,
integration or multiculturalism, that the biggest differences between France and
countries such as America and Britain are to be found (see article).
Over the past decade the British and American economies have generated
impressive growth and plenty of new jobs; the French economy has failed on both
counts.
Why? The main answer is that the French labour market is throttled by
restrictions such as the 35-hour week, a high minimum wage, and tough hiring and
firing rules. Yet even after a decade in office, the supposedly centre-right Mr
Chirac has made little effort to relax these restrictions. The few measures that
his government has cautiously put in place to open up the labour market have
served mainly to entrench a two-tier system, in which insiders continue to
benefit from job and wage protections that are denied to outsiders. Rather than
tackle the fundamental causes of France's high unemployment, Mr Chirac has
recently taken to railing against the evils of Anglo-Saxon market economics and
liberalism (which he has termed the new communism).
It is, of course, the
outsiders, especially the young, unskilled and ill-educated who come
disproportionately from ethnic minorities, who pay the price—and it is these
people who have led the riots. Not only do they feel economically and socially
ostracised; they also see a political elite that appears aloof and detached from
the troubles of their daily life. No wonder so many are affronted by the
language of Nicolas Sarkozy, the interior minister, who dubbed the rioters
“scum” and has promised to expel any foreigners among them.

Disse faktorer fratager naturligvis ikke de enkelte deltager i optøjerne for deres personlige ansvar for deres kriminelle handlinger, som efter min mening bør straffes i videst muligt omfang. Men de data som artiklerne, især WSJ’s, henviser til demonstrerer, at indvandring af lavtuddannet arbejdskraft selv fra ”kulturfremmede” lande kan skabe dynamik og medføre velstand ikke bare for indvandrerne selv men også for modtagerlandet. Hvor det således, bør være udenfor diskussion, at en velfærdsstat og masseindvandring er uforlignelige størrelser (hvorfor jeg anser det som sandsynligt at scenerne fra Paris vil udspille sig i Danmark), kan det samtidig konstateres, at de kulturkonservative ikke har ret i, at ”multikulturalisme” og (betydelig) indvandring automatisk medfører samfundets undergang. Undergangen risikerer kun at indtræde såfremt samfundet er ”socialt” eller ”solidarisk” indrettet såsom i Frankrig og i nogen ringere grad Danmark. Sådanne konklusioner er nok værd at medtage i fremtidige diskussioner om indvandring her i landet hvor debatten primært synes at stå mellem venstrefløjen som prædiker ”åbne grænser og åbne kasser” og de kulturkonservative der bare prædiker lukkede grænser.

Mere ytringsfrihed

En række danske muslimer, nu også støttet af 11 amabassadører fra muslimske lande, har klaget over afbildningen af Muhammad i JP. Jeg er ikke i tvivl om at JP ønskede at provokere og græder tørre tårer over de trusler de har modtaget (vist nok fra en 17 årig skarnsknægt), hvorfor JPs forargelse forargelse forekommer mig noget hul. Men JP skal naturligvis have lov til at provokere og fremme deres islamskeptiske synspunkter, det skal hverken den danske stat eller andre stater blande sig i.

I Italien er Silvio Berlusconi nu blevet sur over, at nogle komikere har gjort grin, ikke med Muhammad, men med Berlusconi selv som Politiken kan berette. Berlusconi har før vist sig parat til at fjerne kritiske røster i medierne med en særdeles ucharmerende form for magtmisbrug. Dene form for statslig indskrænkning af ytringsfriheden er i mine øjne langt mere alvorlig og bekymrende end en fanatisk minoritet, der føler sig gået for nær. Minoriter har ikke politisk magt og det ville være synd at sige, at fatwaen mod Salman Rushdie og mordet på Theo Van Gogh har kvalt debatten om Islam i Europa. Staten derimod kan sætte hele sit tvangsapparat ind bag dens forbud, endog med loven i hånd. Hermed kvæles den frie debat først rigtigt effektivt og staten står derefter fri til at foretage sig hvad den vil uden at kunne kritiseres derfor.

Frevert II

Ovenpå Louise Freverts (eller hendes rådgivers) udtalelser om muslimer på Freverts hjemmeside og i hendes bog har en række caféer besluttet at aflyse debatmøder, hvor Frevert ellers skulle deltage.

Det har fået JP til at skrive en leder, hvori det bl.a. lyder:

Ytringsfriheden burde dog af principielle årsager ikke være begrænset i den
anledning, men efter gældende lov er det i dag i retten, at der trækkes grænser
for, hvad man kan tillade sig af grove og racistiske udtalelser, når forløbet er
klarlagt.
Således er det i ytringsfrihedens navn yderst betænkeligt, at
Louise Frevert nægtes adgang til et valgmøde med andre politikere på restaurant
Hatoba i København af stedets ejer, og at en caféejer i Vanløse overvejer at
gøre noget lignende.
Det er en god demokratisk spilleregel at lytte til
folks holdninger og opponere mod dem, hvis man ikke kan lide dem. Ved at
frakende Louise Frevert retten til at ytre sig dømmes hun også på forhånd, men
det er alene domstolenes opgave at dømme, hvis loven er overtrådt

Jeg kan ikke dele JPs konklusion. De omtalte caféer er privatejede og hvis den private ejendomsret skal have mening må man have lov til at bestemme, at folk som man ikke bryder sig om ikke kan få adgang til ens ejendom. Jeg må således respektere, at Jonny Hansen alene på grund af min hudfarve ikke vil tillade mig ind bag hans flotte rækværk i Greve. Kun hvis en eller flere borgere anvendte vold, eller en overhængende trussel derom, for at stoppe Freverts udtalelser bør staten skride ind og beskytte Frevert.

Hvorvidt caféerne er berettigede til at udelukke Frevert må derfor afgøres udfra hvad der er aftalt parterne imellem (hvis en sådan er indgået). Såfremt det fremgår af aftalen, at den kan ophæves hvis en af de deltagende fremkommer med udtalelser eller udviser adfærd der kan skade caféens omdømme er ophævelsen i orden. En sådan formodning kan måske også indfortolkes som en stiltiende forudsætning for aftalen. Dog kan man mod dette synspunkt indvende, at caféen må eller burde have været vidende om Freverts synspunkter, idet de jo fremgik af både bog og internetside før aftalens indgåelse.